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The properties of quantum information in space-time can be investigated by studying operational
tasks. In one such task, summoning, an unknown quantum state is supplied at one point, and a
call is made at another for it to be returned at a third. Hayden-May recently proved necessary and
sufficient conditions for guaranteeing successful return of a summoned state for finite sets of call and
return points when there is a guarantee of at most one summons. We prove necessary and sufficient
conditions when there may be several possible summonses and complying with any one constitutes
success. We show there is a “quantum paradox of choice” in summoning: the extra freedom in
completing the task makes it strictly harder. This intriguing result has practical applications for
distributed quantum computing and cryptography and also implications for our understanding of
relativistic quantum information and its localization in space-time.
2A Holistic Magician (HM) repeatedly performs the following trick. He first asks you to give him an object that you
are sure he cannot copy. After working behind a curtain, he presents you with N boxes and asks you to choose one.
Opening your chosen box, he reveals the original object inside.
You initially imagine that he has arranged some concealed mechanism that somehow passes the object sequentially
through the boxes, allowing him to stop the mechanism and keep the object in one box if you select it. However, you
are then puzzled to notice that he is unable to make the trick work if you select more than one box, even though you
allow him to choose which of your selections to open. This argues against your mechanical explanation, and indeed
seems to make any simple explanation problematic. How can giving the magician more freedom make him unable to
complete the task?
The so-called paradox of choice – more choice can make consumers less happy – is a familiar concept in economics
[1]. The magician’s paradox, however, is much sharper: more freedom in choosing how to execute a task makes
it impossible. Nonetheless, strange as it may seem, we show that such a situation can indeed arise when quantum
mechanics is combined with classical relativity.
There is a long-standing tradition of using parables and apparent paradoxes to refine our understanding of quantum
theory [2–8]. The effect we describe here is perhaps the first intrinsically relativistic quantum paradox, in the sense
that it can be formulated only in the framework of relativistic quantum theory. It has interesting implications for our
theoretical understanding of relativistic quantum theory and quantum information. It is also of practical relevance in
characterising how quantum states may be propagated in distributed quantum computers, global financial networks
and other contexts where relativistic signalling constraints are important.
Our paradox involves a task known as summoning, in which an agent is given an unknown quantum state and
required to produce it at a point in space-time in response to a call made at some earlier point [9]. We generalize this
task to allow calls to be made at any number of call points, requiring the agent to return the state at any return point
corresponding to one of the calls. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions on the geometric configuration of
call and return points in space-time to guarantee that the task can be completed. Further, we show that these are
strictly stronger conditions than those established by Hayden-May (HM) for the case where it is guaranteed that at
most one call will be made. We adopt the approximation that quantum states may be effectively localized to a point;
see Ref. [10] for further discussion of this approximation and its limitations.
Summoning was first introduced [9] as a simple illustration of a task that distinguishes relativistic quantum theory
from both relativistic classical theories and non-relativistic quantum theory. In its original form, the task involves two
agencies, A and B, each comprising collaborating networks of agents distributed throughout space-time. B secretly
prepares a random quantum state in some agreed Hilbert space – for example, a random qubit – and gives it to A
at some point P . At some later point Q in the causal future of P , B will ask for the state back. The point Q is
not known in advance by A. A simple “no-summoning theorem” shows [9] that, no matter how densely A’s agents
are distributed, and whatever strategy they use, they cannot generally guarantee to comply with B’s request. This
remains true for variations of the task in which time delays in returning and some loss of fidelity in the returned state
are allowed [9].
An example of summoning with separated call and return points was given in [11], where it was shown that there
exist summoning tasks that cannot be completed by simply propagating the unknown state along a fixed path but
can be completed by the use of quantum teleportation. Hayden-May [10] introduced a generalised version of this
summoning task defined by a spacetime point Ps and a set of N ordered pairs of spacetime points {ci, ri}. Alice is
given a quantum system in some unknown state ψ at a start point s. If a call is made at point ci, then Alice must
return a quantum system in state ψ at the corresponding response point ri. We follow HM in stipulating that each
ri must be in the causal future of ci.
1
For definiteness we work in Minkowski space, although our results and most of our comments apply to more general
spacetimes. Write x > y if the spacetime point x is in the causal future of y, and x ≥ y if either x > y or x = y.
HM define the causal diamond Di to be the set {p : ri ≥ p ≥ ci}. They then use iterative applications of quantum
teleportation and secret sharing to prove the following beautiful result:
Theorem 1. [10] Under the assumptions described, summoning is possible if and only if every reveal point ri ≥ s
and every pair of causal diamonds Di and Dj are causally related, meaning that there exists xi ∈ Di and xj ∈ Dj
with xi ≥ xj , or vice versa.
These are considerably weaker conditions than naive intuition might suggest. In particular, there need not neces-
sarily exist a causal path that starts from s and runs sequentially through the causal diamonds.
1 For further discussion of this point, see the Supplementary Material
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FIG. 1. A 2 + 1 dimensional example, taken from Ref [10], where summoning is possible if one call is guaranteed, but not if
more than one call may arrive. The black lines are lightlike and represent singular causal diamonds; the red arrows are also
lightlike.
Summoning is a natural task for distributed quantum computing over networks where relativistic signalling con-
straints are significant. One can imagine quantum data that needs to be routed to one of a number of nodes, with
the destination depending on classical data generated other nodes during the computation. It is natural for these
applications, and also intrinsically theoretically interesting, to introduce another version of summoning, in which calls
may arrive at any number of the call points. Since the ri may be space-like separated, and since in any case we assume
that the unknown state is handed over to another agency when returned, the no-cloning theorem means that Alice
cannot return the state several times. So we define the task such that, if several calls are made at points ci (i ∈ I),
Alice need only return the state at any one of the corresponding return points ri (i ∈ I).
Theorem 2. Summoning with unrestricted calls, as defined above, is possible if and only if (1) every response point
ri ≥ s and (2) for any subset K of {1, . . . , N}, there is at least one k ∈ K such that rk ≥ ci for all i ∈ K.
The proof is given in the Supplementary Material.
Comments 1. Any set of causal diamonds satisfying the conditions of theorem 2 also satisfies those of theorem
1. However, it is easy to construct examples of sets of causal diamonds that satisfy those of theorem 1 but not those
of theorem 2. For example, Fig. 1 describes one such set. Allowing the possibility of more than one call thus makes
the summoning task strictly harder.
2. Nonetheless, the conditions of theorem 2 still do not imply that there is a causal path running from the start
point through each causal diamond. An example is given in Fig. 2.
3. The conditions of theorem 2 imply there is an ordered sequence of causal diamonds Di1 , . . . , DiN such that the
return point of any diamond in the sequence lies in the causal future of the call points of all previous diamonds. This
ordering is not necessarily unique. For example, a nested pair of diamonds, with ci ≤ cj < rj ≤ ri with appropriate
relations to the other diamonds may be taken in either order. More generally, one can construct examples including
sets of n non-overlapping diamonds (ci, ri) (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n) for which ci < rj for all i, j; Fig. 2 gives an example of
this type for n = 3.
Resolution The resolution of the apparent paradox rests on a previously unappreciated feature of summoning
tasks. Prima facie it seems that the guarantee of at most one call plays no special role in a summoning task other
than to ensure that Alice is never required to produce two copies of an unknown state, in violation of the no-cloning
theorem. It thus initially seems paradoxical that summoning becomes strictly harder if we allow the possibility of
more than one call, even though only one valid response is required.
However, if Alice knows that no more than one call will occur, learning that a call has been made at one point tells
her that there are no calls at any other point, and this allows her to coordinate the behaviour of her agents via the
global call distribution. A single call gives Alice less information if multiple calls can occur: she learns nothing about
the distribution of calls at other points. She thus cannot use the call distribution to coordinate her agents’ actions
in the same way. In other words, the guarantee of at most one call provides a resource that gives Alice the ability to
complete tasks that would be impossible without it.
Applications We have given necessary and sufficient conditions for an algorithm that may call for a state at
several distinct nodes but requires the state to be produced at only one associated response node. This is a natural
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FIG. 2. An example with c1, c2, c3 < r1, r2, r3. The diamonds satisfy the conditions of theorem 2, and so summoning with any
number of calls is possible, even though there is no causal path running through all three diamonds. The timelike black lines
run between the call points and their return points and define the centres of the diamonds at each time; the red arrows are
lightlike.
condition in many practical contexts. For example, one can imagine a distributed parallel quantum computation in
which the output of a sub-protocol should be routed to one of several parallel computations, which call for the output
when they reach a certain state. Indeed, in the teleportation model of distributed quantum computation [12], each
round of adaptive computation is essentially a summoning task: the measurement result from the previous round
determines the measurement to be made in the present round, and thus plays the role of the ‘call’, while the locations
of the gates for the various possible measurements play the role of the ‘response points’.
Our conditions are stronger than those required if it is known there will be at most one call, but substantially weaker
than those required if the state were to propagate along some definite causal path. The no-summoning theorem has
also already led to new applications in relativistic quantum cryptography [13–17]. The stronger results reported here
and in Ref. [10] suggest further ways of exploiting summoning as a general way of controlling the flow of quantum
information. We thus expect these results to find application in future cryptographic protocols as well as in quantum
network algorithms.
Our results also have intriguing implications regarding the nature of relativistic quantum information and its
spatio-temporal localization. We discuss these further in the Supplementary Material.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Proof of Theorem 2
Necessity: The no-signalling principle implies that
the first condition is necessary. To see that the second
condition is necessary, suppose for the purpose of obtain-
ing a contradiction that there exists a successful protocol
for any subtask defined from the original task by selecting
some set M of M ≤ N call-response pairs, such that for
every call-response pair (ci, ri) ∈ M, there exists at least
one call-response pair (cj , rj) ∈M such that ri ≯ cj .
Since each return point is in the casual future of the
corresponding call point, Alice may decline to return any-
thing at ri if no call is made at ci. We can thus assume
Alice’s strategy returns no state anywhere if no calls are
made.
From the no-signalling principle, the response made at
ri when calls are made at some set of call points Q with
ci, cj ∈ Q is the same as the response made at ri when
calls are made at the set {Q \ cj}.
Therefore for any ri, ifQi is the total number of subsets
Q ⊆ {c1, c2, ...cM} such that ψ is returned at ri if calls are
made at all points in Q, then Qi must be even. Therefore∑M
i=1Qi must be even.
Since Alice must respond at exactly one point when-
ever calls are made at any subset Q ⊆ {c1, c2, ...cM},
we must have
∑M
i=1Qi =
∑M
j=1 C
M
j = 2
M − 1, which is
always odd.
So there exists a successful protocol for the sub-task
defined by the setM only if there exists at least one call-
response pair (ci, ri) ∈ M such that ri is in the future
lightcone of the call point for every pair in M.
Since this reasoning may be applied to any sub-task,
there exists a successful protocol for a summoning task
without guarantee with N call-response pairs only if for
any subset S of call-response pairs, at least one response
point rk belonging to a pair in S lies in the future light-
cone of all the other call points belonging to pairs in S.
Sufficiency: We now show that the conditions are suf-
ficient, by exhibiting a protocol that always succeeds if
the call-response pairs satisfy the conditions of theorem
2. Define SN = {1, . . . , N}. From the second condi-
tion of theorem 2, there is at least one i ∈ SN such that
ri ≥ cj for all j ∈ SN . Choose one such, iN , and de-
fine SN−1 = SN \ {i}. Similarly, choose iN−1 ∈ SN−1
such that riN−1 ≥ cj for all j ∈ SN−1, and so on.
We thus obtain an ordered sequence of causal diamonds
Di1 , . . . , DiN such that the return point of any diamond
in the sequence lies in the causal future of the call points
of all previous diamonds. We relabel the Dij , cij , rij ,
writing j for ij.
Alice may now proceed as follows. Let d be the agreed
dimension of the Hilbert space of the unknown state ψ.
Before the protocol begins, she distributes maximally en-
tangled pairs of states in Cd ⊗ Cd between agents at the
spatial locations of (s, c1), (c1, c2), . . . , (cN−1, cN). When
the state is given to her at s, her agent there teleports it
to c1, broadcasting the classical teleportation data. If a
call arrives at c1, the agent at c1 transmits the quantum
part of the teleported state (i.e. her half of the entangled
pair) to r1, where another agent uses the classical tele-
portation data to reconstruct the state and return it to
Bob.
If a call does not arrive at c1, Alice’s agent there tele-
ports the state to c2, broadcasting the classical telepor-
tation data. If a call arrives at c2, the quantum part of
the teleported state is sent to r2, where the classical tele-
portation data from s and c1 are used to reconstruct and
return the state. Otherwise, the process continues, until
either a call arrives at some ci (and the state is recon-
structed and returned at ri) or there is no call. In the
latter case, Alice may reconstruct the state at rN if she
wishes, but does not return it to Bob.
Summoning without restrictions on the geometry
In the main text, we follow HM in assuming that each
return point ri lies in the causal future of its call point
ci. Actually, this assumption is slightly restrictive, since
it can be possible to complete the task even when one of
the ri lies outside the causal future of its call point ci.
However, the theorem has a simple generalisation that
covers this case, as we show below.
A related issue is that HM stipulate that at most one
call will be made, but do not explicitly define the task
requirements if no call is made. One natural definition
is to require that Alice should return a quantum state
at ri only if she is certain at ri that a call was made
at ci. Hence, she should not return any state anywhere
if no call is made. With this refinement, it follows that
each return point must indeed be in the future of the
corresponding call point, as HM assume.
However, another natural definition of the task is
to allow Alice to return a quantum state anywhere or
nowhere, as she chooses, if no call is made. In one ver-
sion of this task, any returned state must be the state
originally supplied, even if no call is made. Another pos-
sibility is to allow Alice to return any state when no call
is made. Even the first, stronger, version, is possible for
configurations where theorem 1 does not apply, as we
now show.
Recall again that the conditions of theorem 1 assume
that each ri lies in the causal future of its call point
ci, so that each causal diamond Di is well-defined and
non-empty. The theorem then shows that summoning is
possible only if for every pair i, j, the causal diamonds
Di and Dj are causally related.
Consider now the case where we have only two possible
call points, c1 and c2, with corresponding return points
2r1 and r2. If summoning is possible, r1 and r2 must lie
in the future of the start point s. However, summoning
may be possible even if one of the causal diamonds D1,
D2 is empty, i.e. even if one of the ri does not lie in the
future of ci.
This is because in the case of only two call points,
learning that no call is made at c1 implies that either
there is a call at c2 or no call at all. Hence, if r2 > c1, we
can construct a successful protocol even if it is not the
case that r2 > c2.
1. Before the protocol starts, Alice shares an entan-
gled pair between agents who will be at s and c1.
2. When the state is handed over at s, Alice teleports
it to c1, broadcasting the classical data in all direc-
tions.
3. If a call is received at c1, Alice’s agent at c1 sends
the quantum teleportation data (i.e. her part of
the entangled pair) to r1, where it is combined with
the classical teleportation data to reconstruct the
state, which is handed over to Bob. Alice’s agent
at c1 broadcasts the fact that she has received a
call. Alice’s agent at r2 then does not hand over
anything.
4. If no call is received at c1, Alice’s agent there sends
the quantum teleportation data to r2, where it is
combined with the classical teleportation data and
handed over to Bob.
Thus if a call is made at c1 the state is at r1 at the end
of the protocol; if a call is made at c2 (or no call is made
at all) the state is at r2 at the end of the protocol.
Hayden-May’s proof [1] shows that a protocol for any
number of call points can be built recursively out of a
protocol for two call points. Their argument extends to
the more general configurations we consider. Theorem 1
can thus be extended as follows:
Theorem 1. A summoning task defined by a set of N
ordered pairs {ci, ri} is possible iff the following condi-
tions hold:
Every response point is in the future lightcone of the start
point.
For every pair {ci, ri}, {cj, rj}, both of the response points
lie in the future lightcone of a single call point.
Note that it follows that for every pair i, j at least one
of the causal diamondsDi, Dj must exist, so there can be
at most one call-response point pair for which the causal
diamond does not exist.
Discussion and interpretation
Like the original no-summoning theorem, our results
rely crucially on both relativity and quantum theory.
In particular, the distinction between summoning tasks
with and without guarantees of a single call, and indeed
that there are interesting constraints on summoning tasks
at all, relies both on the impossibility of superluminal
signalling and on the no-cloning theorem. Our results
also exploit the delocalizability of quantum information
via quantum teleportation, which allows summoning in
configurations where sending the state along any given
causal path fails.
Our results thus allow us to probe intuitions about
the nature of quantum states as spatiotemporal entities
– a question which has received comparatively little at-
tention in recent debates over the reality of the quan-
tum state [2–10]. There is a tradition in physics, thus
far largely unanalysed, of describing quantum states and
quantum information using the language of persisting
physical objects [11]. For example, Horodecki et al.’s
widely cited review [12] states: “This is the essence of
teleportation: a quantum state is transferred from one
place to another: not copied to other place, but moved
to that place.” Hayden-May follow in this tradition in
interpreting their result: “We fully characterize which
regions of spacetime can all hold the same quantum in-
formation. Because quantum information can be delocal-
ized through quantum error correction and teleportation,
it need not follow well-defined trajectories. Instead, repli-
cation of the information in any configuration of space-
time regions not leading to violations of causality or the
no-cloning principle is allowed. . . . This provides a simple
and complete description of where and when a qubit can
be located in spacetime, revealing a remarkable variety
of possibilities.”[1]
We question whether HM’s spatiotemporal account of
the quantum state during summoning tasks can be sup-
ported. Indeed, even before considering the implications
of theorems 1 and 2, we find it a little tricky to under-
stand what exactly Hayden-May’s quotation is intended
to mean.
One technical complication is that the causal diamonds
in a summoning task may overlap or even be identical. In
this case, even if two overlapping diamonds in some sense
each hold a copy of the state, it could be a single copy
held in their intersection. HM do not explicitly consider
the possibility of overlaps. Since we wish to consider the
case most favourable to their interpretation, we assume
non-overlapping diamonds here.
A more fundamental concern is that, if the quantum
information were replicated in the usual sense within each
causal diamond in a configuration satisfying HM’s con-
ditions, ordinary reasoning would suggest that, given a
request at any number of call points, it should be possible
to produce a copy of the state at each of the correspond-
ing return points. This would violate the no-cloning theo-
rem, of course, and evidently is not the intended meaning
– hence HM’s phrase “replicated but in a restricted fash-
ion”
3that replication in time is not the same as replication in
space – but how, exactly?
HM’s comment that “reversibility . . . requires that
[quantum] information be copied in time” suggests the
following analogy. The quantum information in an un-
known state with known unitary evolution can be cap-
tured and handed over at any given time, or more gen-
erally on any given spacelike hypersurface in a foliation.
Once this happens, though, it cannot be repeated: if the
state is requested again at later times (or on later hyper-
surfaces), Alice cannot provide a second copy. An anal-
ogous statement about summoning would be that, when
the conditions of theorem 1 hold, if several requests are
made, the quantum information can be handed over in
one causal diamond, but then this cannot be repeated in
the other diamonds. However, as our result shows, this
is not generally the case! Requesting the state at several
HM call points prevents a successful response, unless the
configuration of call and return points also satisfies the
stronger conditions of our theorem 2.
Unlike the conditions of theorem 1, those of theorem 2
allow an ordering of the diamonds, albeit not necessarily
a unique one. Moreover, they allow a strategy that ef-
fectively (although not literally) responds to the calls in
the chosen ordered sequence. We believe this is a crucial
distinction. It takes us closer to the case of a unitarily
evolving state that can be requested at any time or on
any hypersurface in a foliation, for which the time coordi-
nates or hypersurfaces are likewise ordered. And indeed,
if Alice follows our strategy, then at each call point ci
she knows that, if the state is not being returned as the
result of an earlier call, and if she chooses not to teleport
her state to ci+1, then – at least in the informal language
physicists tend to use when discussing teleportation – the
unknown state’s quantum information will be contained
within Di. That is, there is a quantum state at ci, to-
gether with classical information available at or before
ri, which could be brought together and recombined to
reconstruct the state at ri.
So what can we consistently say about the flow of quan-
tum information in summoning tasks, in the light of our
results? One safe option, of course, is to remain silent,
retreating instead to a purely operationalist perspective.
Proving results about possible and impossible quantum
tasks in space-time [13] does not necessarily require any
discussion of the localization or location of quantum in-
formation in space-time, as theorems 1 and 2 illustrate.
Operationalism avoids the risk of fallacies that can arise
from regarding (quantum) information as a physical sub-
stance [11].
That said, whatever view one takes on the reality of
quantum states, even speaking informally about the lo-
calization of quantum information could be a very helpful
way of proving and synthesizing operational results, if it
accurately reflects their implications. Our suggestion is
thus not that such language should necessarily be elimi-
nated altogether, but rather that it needs to be analysed
critically and used more precisely. In particular, if the be-
haviour of quantum information in a system depends on
external events, such as the calls in a summoning task, we
would argue that any discussion of its localization should
reflect this explicitly. For example, a more precise infor-
mal statement of Hayden-May’s result would be that if
Alice follows their prescribed strategy, and if a call arrives
at ci and no call arrives at any other call point, then the
unknown state’s quantum information becomes localized
within Di and the state is reconstructed at ri. This fram-
ing precludes speaking of “replication of the information
in [the given] configuration of spacetime regions”, since
the possibilities of localizing the state within Di and Dj
are alternatives that depend on exclusive possible exter-
nal events. We suggest too that any statements about
the localization of quantum information in space-time –
including those we give above for our version of the task
– may be best seen as hypotheses that seem to usefully
synthesize and summarize operational results, but might
yet need to be refined or even rejected.
Further comments on the quantum state and
spatiotemporal reality
Our results directly apply only to summoning tasks;
they do not give a definitive answer to the general ques-
tion about when and whether it is correct (or at least
consistent) to think of quantum states as though they
were real physical objects that can move in space and
persist over time (albeit perhaps discontinuously, as the
quotation from Ref. [12] suggests is the case during tele-
portation). Still, they suggest to us that this and related
questions deserve closer analysis and that examining rel-
ativistic quantum tasks [13] might yield further insights.
To take one interesting example, the celebrated PBR
theorem [3, 4] purportedly addresses only the question of
whether the quantum state is an element of reality in the
instantaneous sense set out by Harrigan and Spekkens [2].
It seems to us that some caution is merited here, since
the proof of the theorem depends implicitly on assump-
tions not only about states at a given time, but about
the persistence of those states over time. Specifically,
the argument hinges on the assumption of preparation
independence, the idea that ‘systems that are prepared
independently have independent physical states,’ and it is
assumed without comment that the systems must there-
fore continue to have independent physical states when
they are brought together and measured, in which case
it is possible to derive a contradiction between the pre-
dictions of quantum mechanics and the predictions of
any model which allows some overlap between the ontic
states associated with different quantum states. Several
authors [4, 14, 15] have pointed out that the argument
fails if we relax the assumption of preparation indepen-
4dence. However, these criticisms of preparation indepen-
dence have been directed almost exclusively at the claim
that the states are independent at the time of prepara-
tion. For example, Ref. [14] proposes that even when a
systems are prepared in a product state they might have
global properties not reducible to properties of their sub-
systems, while Ref. [16] suggests the preparations might
fail to be independent due to their common past. Less
attention has been given to the fact that PBR must also
claim that these independent states persist over time so
that the systems still have the same independent states
at the time of the measurement. It seems to us that what
the PBR theorem really establishes is that if quantum
systems have localized physical states which persist over
time, and the other explicit assumptions of the theorem
hold, then those states must carry all the same infor-
mation as the quantum state. The theorem thus carries
no weight against views which deny this spatiotemporal
account of physical states in the first place. For exam-
ple, the theorem per se offers no reason to reject any
view which suggests that measurement results may de-
pend directly on preparations without being mediated
by any persisting physical state, quantum or otherwise.
It is true that there exist later ψ-ontology theorems
which come closer to addressing the kind of spatioempo-
ral concerns we raise here. In particular, Hardy’s theo-
rem [5] and the Colbeck-Renner theorem [6] both concern
themselves with dynamics rather than merely kinemat-
ics, and so deal more explicitly with the passage of time.
However these theorems likewise work within the estab-
lished ontological models framework which presupposes
that past events may influence future ones only via the
mediation of some persisting physical state, and thus like
PBR, can be circumvented by denying this sort of spa-
tiotemporal account of quantum states. This suggests to
us that a more detailed analysis of possible and impossi-
ble relativistic quantum tasks, and of their implications
for hypotheses about the temporal persistence of quan-
tum and ontic states, might shed some interesting new
light on our understanding of the quantum state and its
relationship to reality.
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